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Abstract 
This paper examines the causality between military expenditure and income inequality in 
selected Asian countries namely Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, India and South 
Korea for the period 1970-2005. Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing 
procedure is employed to (1) analyze the impact of military expenditure on income inequality 
and (2) the impact of income inequality on military expenditure as well. Interestingly our results 
indicate one way causality running from military expenditure to income inequality only for the 
case of Malaysia and bidirectional causality for the case of Singapore. As for the remaining 
countries, no meaningful relationship could be detected and it can be seen as sign of good 
governance in these countries. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Causality relationship between military expenditure and income inequality has been subject of 
interest of many parties; however the lack of availability information on its statistics and data has 
been a stumbling block to more researches being conducted. Out of the few studies that have 
been done, results are often mixed. Ali (2007) made one of the early attempts on a global scale, 
to identify the relationship between military expenditure and inequality. They treat economic 
growth as a control variable rather than a dependent variable and emphasize on the impact of 
military expenditure on income inequality only. In this study we went a step ahead by treating 
income inequality, as both reggresor (control variable) and reggresand (dependant). 
 
Theoretically it is believed that there are number of ways by which military expenditure may be 
cointegrated with income inequality. (1) Any increase in military expenditure could be at the 
expense of public spending on social programs such as health and education which in turn will 
have an equalizing effect. (2) The taxes required to support military spending may fall 
disproportionately on the middle classes; if so, post-tax income inequality might be at a risk of 
increasing. (3) High levels of military spending may reflect the use of violence as a means of 
social control, notably against trade unions and other egalitarian social forces thus, it is not 
surprising to witness that higher military spending means more societal control and a sacrifice of 
egalitarian values. 
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On the other hand, looking at it from another perspective (4) military experience may cut in the 
other direction. The military absorbs low-skilled labor, which may raise wages for the young and 
unskilled. Mobilization for war may require equalizing concession to labor’s interests. In 
general, the more equipment-intensive military expenditure, the more we expect the inequality-
increasing effects to dominate; the more labor-intensive the military and home grown the 
military production, the more we might expect to find inequality-reduction effects in the data It 
can even be (5) no-cointegration at all, when there are good governance, respective governments 
carefully planning their policies and budget, so that military expenditure would not stand in the 
way of spending on other important aspects, such as education, health, public amenities etc. 
Caputo (1975) was one of the earlier studies on public policy implications of military and 
welfare expenditures. The subject became more popular and much more researches were 
conducted, however most of these researches were centered around military expenditure and 
economic growth, such as to name a few, Hassan et al (2003), Al-Yousif (2002), Shieh et al 
(2002),  and  Kollias et al (2004a and 2004b). As for the military expenditure and income 
inequality, as mentioned above, Ali (2007) was one of the few papers other than Boswell and 
Dixon (1990), Auvinen and Nafziger (1999), Jorgensen (2005) 
 
 
2. Trend of Military Expenditure and Inequality in ASAN Countries 
 
Military expenditure and income inequality has been an important component in economy. 
Figure 1 display the trend of military expenditure in six selected Asian countries; Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, India and South Korea. It can clearly be seen that, the 
volatility is quite high for almost all the selected countries for the period 1970 to 1988, however, 
it stabilizes after 1988.  
 
As for Figure 2, Singapore and South Korea show declining pattern in inequality (better income 
distribution) for the period 1972 to 1997, while Malaysia, quite the contrary, shows an increasing 
( worsening income distribution) for the period 1982 to 1990. While for the case of Indonesia, 
there are fluctuations in inequality pattern from 1974 to 1990 and declining after that and finally, 
the Philippines show an increasing trend. 
 
Figure 3 show the military expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic products in these six 
countries for three different time, albeit, 1970, 1990 and 2006. As can bee seen for all three 
different point of time, Singapore is the highest spender in terms of ratio to GDP. Malaysia was 
second highest in 1970, dropped to fourth among these six countries in 1990 and remained fourth 
in 2006 as well. Indonesia ranked fifth in all three points of time, similar to the Philippines who 
ranked sixth in all. South Korea ranked third in 1970, climbed to second in 1990 and dropped 
back to third in 2006.And finally India ranked fourth in 170, climbed to third in 1990 and 
remained there for 2006.  
. 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
3. Review of Related Literature 
 
Ali (2007) examines the effect of military spending on inequality controlling for the size of 
armed forces, GDP growth, per capita income and other possible determinants. Their hypothesis 
is that as per capita military expenditure increases, inequality increase, controlling for the size of 
armed forces, and for regional and economic variables. They found consistent estimates that 
there is positive effect of military expenditure on income inequality, and it is robust across 
variable definitions and model specifications. Given the close relationship, this result suggest 
tthat an increase in the military expenditure’s of a country will worsen the income distribution 
(increase the income inequality. The same results were shared by Jorgensen (2005), Auvinen and 
Nafziger (1999), Auvinen and Nafziger (2002), Jayadev and Bowles (2006) but was contrary to 
Henderson et al (2008) 
Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) explained that  there is a high correlation between high 
ratio of military expenditures to income and high income inequality and ultimately this can turn 
into source of humanitarian emergency, a view that  was supported by their following paper , 
Auvinen and Nafziger (2002), Jayadev and Bowles (2006), in their study on participation in 
Guard Labor in the United States, claimed that these people could have been employed in other 
productive sectors, and by serving in the less productive sector ( Guard Labor), it contributed to a 
higher income inequality (worsening income distribution). However the finding of Henderson et 
al (2008) was on the contrary, in their study on the transition countries of Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, they found that these countries during their transition, with a cut budget on their 
military expenditures still turned out worse off, with a higher income inequality. They then 
suggested that there could be elements of hidden inequality in these countries in their past 
history.  
 
 
4. Metholodogy 
 
ARDL Approach to Causality Test 
 
 
In order to test for causality between military expenditure and economic growth we utilized the 
autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) popularize by Pesaran et al. (2001). The ARDL has 
numerous advantages. Firstly, the ARDL approach is able to examine the presence of short run 
as well as long run relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. 
Secondly, the ARDL model takes a sufficient numbers of lags to capture the data generating 
process in a general to specific modeling framework (Laurenceson and Chai, 2003). Apart from 
that, unrestricted error-correction model (UECM) is likely to have better statistical properties 
than the two-step Engle-Granger method because, unlike the Engle-Granger method, the UECM 
does not push the short –run dynamics into the residual term (Banerjee et al, 1998). Finally, the 
ARDL approach provides robust result in a small sample size. Since the sample size of our study 
is small, this provides more motivation for this study to adopt this model. 
 
 
 
4 
 
The ARDL unrestricted error correction model (UECM) is shown below: 
 
 
 
whereby MILEX is the ratio of military expenditure to GDP, I is  income inequality, ∆ is the first 
difference operator, L denote variables in logarithm and  and  are serially independent 
random errors.  
 
To examine the long- run relationship, the bound cointegration test based on F-statistic taken 
from Narayan and Narayan, (2005) will be used. The null hypothesis for no cointegration among 
the variables in Eq. (1) is ( ) denoted by FMILEX against the alternative 
( ). Similarly, for Eq. (2) the null hypothesis for no long-run meaningful 
relationship among the variables is ( ) as denoted by FI against the alternative 
( ). 
The two asymptotic critical values bound provide a test for cointegration when the independent 
variables are I(d) (where 0≤ d ≤ 1): a lower value assuming the regressors are I(0), and an upper 
value assuming purely I(1) regressors. If the test statistic exceed the upper critical value, we can 
conclude that a long – run relationship exist regardless of whether the underlying order of 
integration of variable are zero or one. If the test statistics fall below the lower critical values we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. However, if the statistic fall between these 
two bound, inference would be inconclusive. 
 
Description and sources of data 
 
The data used in this study are annual data on military expenditure and inequality for the selected 
Asian countries. The countries are Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippine, Singapore, India and Korea. 
MILEX is measure by the military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. This data was obtained 
from various issues of SIPRI Yearbook and SIPRI online database.  Meanwhile the data for the 
income inequality, for the corresponding period was obtained from University of Texas, which 
are estimates of gross household income inequality, computed from a regression relationship 
between the Deininger and Squire inequality measures and the UTIP-UNIDO pay inequality 
measures. All the data used in the study were transformed into logarithm. 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
We tested for the order of integration for military expenditure and income inequality before 
proceeding to testing for cointegration by using the ARDL bounds testing procedure,. Table 1 
show the results of the unit root test for the test of the order of integration of the economic time 
series under investigation. Clearly the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) 
statistics indicate that both the military expenditure and income inequality economic series in 
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selected Asian countries are stationary after first differencing ( I(1) ) thus our relevant critical 
values are the upper bound of purely I(1) regressors. These results are tabulated in Table 2 (Panel 
A and Panel B). Whereby in Panel A, the dependent variable is income inequality and in Panel 
B, the dependent variable is military expenditure. It can be summarized that there seems to be 
unidirectional causality from military expenditure to income inequality in Malaysia while for the 
case of Singapore there seems to be bidirectional causality. As for the other countries, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected in all the cases (Panel A and Panel B), these 
results suggest that there are no long-run relationships between military expenditure and income 
inequality in these countries namely, India, South Korea, Thailand and Philippines.  
Table 3 Panel A and Panel B) display the long run coefficients results. For both Malaysia and 
Singapore case, it is positively significant; any increase in Military expenditure will increase 
income inequality (worsening income distribution) as for panel B (military expenditure as a 
dependant variable) Singapore’s income inequality is also positively related with military 
expenditure 
Table 4 display the results of the impulse response of counties, based on VECM for Malaysia 
and Singapore, while for the remaining countries based on VAR, and again the results are robust 
It clearly shows that any shocks in the military expenditure does not constitutes any shocks to 
income inequality vice versa for India, South Korea, Thailand and Philippines On the other hand, 
any shock to military expenditure does causes shock to income inequality for Malaysia and for 
Singapore it is both way.  
As for variance decomposition, the results shown in Table 5 to Table 10 are similar to prior 
finding whereby showing the same pattern of results, there are no meaningful relationship 
between these variables (military expenditure and income inequality) for India, South Korea, 
Thailand and Philippines (in fact percentage changes that contributed to the other variable is too 
small and it stabilizes after a few periods).while for Malaysia and Singapore the results are 
similar to ARDL and IRF.. These results are very consistent in nature 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this study the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing procedure was employed 
to investigate the long-run relationship between military expenditure and income inequality in 
six selected Asian countries, namely Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippine, South Korea and 
India. A bivariate analysis on the impact of income inequality on military expenditure, vice versa 
the impact of  military expenditure on income inequality was conducted. The sample period was 
1970 – 2005 and the data was annual. All the data went through log-log transformation so that 
the estimates will be less sensitive to outliers or influential observations and also in order to 
reduce the data range. 
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The results suggest that all the variables chosen are I(1) or in other words they are non-stationary 
variables and achieved stationarity only after first differencing. The cointegration analysis using 
the ARDL bounds testing approach clearly indicates that only in the case of Malaysia and 
Singapore, the military are cointegrated with income inequality. Though the results are 
interesting, not much comparison could be made because not many researches done on this issue, 
even the few researches made, they normally treat income inequality as the dependant variable 
only as in the case of Ali (2007).  
However our results for the case of Malaysia and Singapore are concuurent with his finding, 
whereby any increase in Military expenditure will worsen of income distribution (higher income 
inequality.. as also supported by Caputo (1975) who explained that there is a trade off between 
defense and welfare expenditure. Another paper with similar result is of  Jayadev and Bowles 
(2006), however their argument is different, they claimed that being in the lower productivity 
sector (Guard Labor) deprives the nation of their contribution in other hiher productivity sectors, 
thus worsening income distribution resulting higher income inequality. And as for the remaining 
countries, no trace of cointegration among these variables can be concluded as a sign of good 
governance and good policy making, whereby the decisions of military expenditure is 
independent and does not have any whatsoever impact on income distribution.   
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Figure 1: Military expenditure in ASIAN countries. 
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Sources: SIPRI yearbook, various issues 
 
Figure 2: Inequality in ASIAN countries. 
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Figure 3: Military Expenditure for Selected Asian Countries in 1970, 1990 and 2006 
 
Sources: SIPRI yearbook, various issues 
 
Table 1: Results of Unit Root Test for Series Level  
 
ASEAN-5 LI LMILEX 
ADF t-statistic Lag ADF t-statistic Lag 
     
Indonesia -2.485 0 -2.593 2 
 [0.33]  [0.28]  
     
Malaysia -2.174 1 -2.360 0 
 [0.48]  [0.39]  
     
Philippine -2.971 0 -1.887 1 
 [0.15]  [0.63]  
     
Singapore -1.835 1 -3.309 1 
 [0.66]  [0.08]  
     
India -1.651 0 -1.972 0 
 [0.75]  [0.59]  
     
Korea -1.754 0 -0.981 0 
 [0.70]  [0.93]  
     
Notes: Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at 5% level.  
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Table 2: Results of Unit Root Test for Series First Difference  
 
ASEAN-5 LI LMILEX 
ADF t-statistic Lag ADF t-statistic Lag 
     
Indonesia -5.874 0 -5.021 0 
 [0.00]*  [0.00]*  
     
Malaysia -3.808 0 -5.097 0 
 [0.00]*  [0.00]*  
     
Philippine -7.474 0 -4.140 1 
 [0.00]*  [0.00]*  
     
Singapore -3.912 1 -4.466 1 
 [0.00]*  [0.00]*  
     
India -5.211 0 -4.833 0 
 [0.00]*  [0.00]*  
     
Korea -7.399  -5.941 0 
 [0.00]*  [0.00]*  
     
Notes: Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at 5% level 
 
 
Table 3: Bounds Test for Cointegration Analysis Based on the Equation 1 and Equation 2 
 
Panel A 
Dependent variable LI, Independent variable LMILEX 
n Critical value  Lower Bound Value Upper Bound Value 
30 5% 4.090 4.663 
35 5% 3.957 4.530 
 
 
Computed F- statistic 
Countries F-Statistic 
Indonesia 3.2073 
Malaysia 8.1759* 
Philippine 
Singapore 
India 
Korea 
1.2587 
4.5901* 
3.2941 
0.6370 
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Panel B 
Dependent variable LMILEX, Independent variable LI 
n Critical value  Lower Bound Value Upper Bound Value 
30 5% 4.090 4.663 
35 5% 3.957 4.530 
 
 
Computed F- statistic 
Countries F-Statistic 
Indonesia 1.6459 
Malaysia 0.4302 
Philippine 
Singapore 
India 
Korea 
1.6126 
5.4879* 
3.0022 
3.7224 
  
Notes: Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at 5% level.  
 
 
Table 3: Long – run coefficient  
 
Panel A 
Dependent : LI 
Coefficient t-statistic 
Independent: LMILEX 
Indonesia  0.1029  2.7191 
Malaysia  0.1516*  2.8874 
Philippine -0.0327 -0.8609 
Singapore  0.3299  2.0727 
Korea -0.1956 -0.8133 
India -0.0317 -0.3436 
Notes: Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at 5% level. 
 
Panel B 
Dependent : LMILEX 
Coefficient t-statistic 
Independent: LI 
Indonesia  9.7502  1.7826 
Malaysia -3.7831 -0.3307 
Philippine -2.5314 -0.5479 
Singapore  1.2251*  3.1538 
Korea 22.1364  0.3777 
India -0.7933 -0.3221 
Notes: Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at 5% level. 
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Table 4: The Results of Impulse Response for Asia Countries 
Indonesia 
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Malaysia 
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Philippine 
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Singapore 
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India 
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Korea 
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Table 5: Variance Decomposition for Indonesia 
 
Variance Decomposition of LI:      Variance Decomposition of LM: 
 
Period S.E. LI LM   S.E. LI LM 
1 0.022925 100 0  0.165022 2.653384 97.34662 
  0 0   -6.82756 -6.82756 
2 0.027867 99.10883 0.891174  0.227362 7.580501 92.4195 
  -5.26673 -5.26673   -11.842 -11.842 
3 0.031397 93.88101 6.118991  0.271018 12.07511 87.92489 
  -11.0515 -11.0515   -13.9801 -13.9801 
4 0.034703 86.87199 13.12801  0.307294 15.82857 84.17143 
  -16.2466 -16.2466   -15.456 -15.456 
5 0.037922 80.13026 19.86974  0.339722 18.84457 81.15543 
  -19.2965 -19.2965   -16.904 -16.904 
6 0.041052 74.34026 25.65974  0.369778 21.24321 78.75679 
  -20.9493 -20.9493   -18.3616 -18.3616 
7 0.044088 69.55419 30.44581  0.398207 23.15797 76.84203 
  -21.8963 -21.8963   -19.6217 -19.6217 
8 0.047034 65.62939 34.37061  0.425443 24.70219 75.29781 
  -22.5405 -22.5405   -20.6567 -20.6567 
9 0.049901 62.39588 37.60412  0.451764 25.96374 74.03626 
  -23.0639 -23.0639   -21.5038 -21.5038 
10 0.052698 59.70614 40.29386  0.477362 27.00834 72.99166 
    -23.5083 -23.5083     -22.1952 -22.1952 
Notes: Cholesky Ordering: LI LM, Standard Errors:  Monte Carlo (100 repetitions)                              
 
Table 6: Variance Decomposition for Malaysia 
Variance Decomposition of LM:   Variance Decomposition of LI: 
 
Period S.E. LM LI   S.E. LM LI 
1 0.266557 95.64534 4.354663  0.014783 0 100 
2 0.377034 96.01499 3.985006  0.017077 0.273237 99.72676 
3 0.44892 89.52627 10.47373  0.018914 11.43213 88.56787 
4 0.491782 89.77204 10.22796  0.022343 35.85366 64.14634 
5 0.520347 90.43182 9.568181  0.030903 64.65095 35.34905 
6 0.541778 90.87705 9.122947  0.040849 77.10891 22.89109 
7 0.552736 91.22093 8.779066  0.049864 81.27815 18.72185 
8 0.561965 91.49932 8.500684  0.057151 83.53265 16.46735 
9 0.573034 91.82453 8.175469  0.062367 85.01956 14.98044 
10 0.585868 92.14817 7.85183   0.066048 86.07387 13.92613 
Notes: Cholesky Ordering: LI LM, Standard Errors:  Monte Carlo (100 repetitions)           
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Table 7: Variance Decomposition for Philippine 
   
Variance Decomposition of 
LI:      Variance Decomposition of LM: 
 
Period S.E. LI LM   S.E. LI LM 
1 0.023289 100 0  0.145828 1.057613 98.94239 
  0 0   -4.47486 -4.47486 
2 0.026771 99.56198 0.438021  0.217376 0.532303 99.4677 
  -3.38495 -3.38495   -4.91326 -4.91326 
3 0.028245 97.12752 2.872483  0.254707 3.255674 96.74433 
  -5.44155 -5.44155   -8.26713 -8.26713 
4 0.0293 93.48713 6.512867  0.278368 9.86498 90.13502 
  -8.44007 -8.44007   -12.6839 -12.6839 
5 0.030191 90.31968 9.680322  0.295458 16.35462 83.64538 
  -11.2921 -11.2921   -15.5529 -15.5529 
6 0.030915 88.22972 11.77028  0.307406 20.77633 79.22367 
  -12.7343 -12.7343   -17.1077 -17.1077 
7 0.031485 87.00087 12.99913  0.315548 23.35761 76.64239 
  -13.6331 -13.6331   -18.0559 -18.0559 
8 0.031923 86.26725 13.73275  0.321304 24.82582 75.17418 
  -14.4606 -14.4606   -18.7374 -18.7374 
9 0.032254 85.78099 14.21901  0.3256 25.72254 74.27746 
  -15.2145 -15.2145   -19.2824 -19.2824 
10 0.032503 85.42064 14.57936  0.328911 26.34074 73.65926 
    -15.8594 -15.8594     -19.7411 -19.7411 
Notes: Cholesky Ordering: LI LM, Standard Errors:  Monte Carlo (100 repetitions)           
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Table 8: Variance Decomposition for Singapore 
Variance Decomposition of LI:   Variance Decomposition of LM: 
 
Period S.E. LI LM S.E. LI LM 
1 0.01596 100 0 0.094554 5.824267 94.17573 
2 0.031067 98.26474 1.735263 0.128454 31.46932 68.53068 
3 0.042983 96.65819 3.341806 0.14217 42.28278 57.71722 
4 0.050975 96.7781 3.221896 0.147478 41.43657 58.56343 
5 0.056207 97.28511 2.714888 0.148118 41.92341 58.07659 
6 0.060201 97.61928 2.380721 0.153195 43.96428 56.03572 
7 0.064082 97.77378 2.226215 0.161674 48.69535 51.30465 
8 0.068315 97.75849 2.241512 0.16817 52.55435 47.44565 
9 0.072621 97.77204 2.227961 0.171954 54.601 45.399 
10 0.076588 97.86095 2.139051 0.174805 56.06379 43.93621 
 Cholesky Ordering: LI LM     
       
 
       
 Variance Decomposition of LI:   Variance Decomposition of LM: 
 
Period S.E. LI LM S.E. LI LM 
1 0.01596 94.17573 5.824267 0.094554 0 100 
2 0.031067 87.41166 12.58834 0.128454 17.25636 82.74364 
3 0.042983 83.56941 16.43059 0.14217 32.35628 67.64372 
4 0.050975 83.60554 16.39446 0.147478 33.89552 66.10448 
5 0.056207 84.9227 15.0773 0.148118 34.45745 65.54255 
6 0.060201 85.89814 14.10186 0.153195 35.45686 64.54314 
7 0.064082 86.19503 13.80497 0.161674 39.16031 60.83969 
8 0.068315 86.05097 13.94903 0.16817 43.08837 56.91163 
9 0.072621 85.99287 14.00713 0.171954 45.42669 54.57331 
10 0.076588 86.15368 13.84632 0.174805 46.93114 53.06886 
Notes:  Cholesky Ordering: LI LM, Standard Errors:  Monte Carlo (100 repetitions)             
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Table 9: Variance Decomposition for India 
Variance Decomposition of 
LI:      Variance Decomposition of LM: 
 
Period S.E. LI LM   S.E. LI LM 
1 0.01017 100 0  0.075708 15.45394 84.54606 
  0 0   -11.3684 -11.3684 
2 0.014074 96.44746 3.552535  0.106976 10.31343 89.68657 
  -5.45812 -5.45812   -10.7977 -10.7977 
3 0.016629 93.68182 6.318178  0.123263 8.319606 91.68039 
  -8.69645 -8.69645   -11.0174 -11.0174 
4 0.018296 92.53814 7.461861  0.130617 7.556469 92.44353 
  -11.1295 -11.1295   -11.3122 -11.3122 
5 0.019361 92.37748 7.622519  0.133372 7.304724 92.69528 
  -12.6125 -12.6125   -11.6441 -11.6441 
6 0.020041 92.59423 7.40577  0.134181 7.253678 92.74632 
  -13.5325 -13.5325   -11.9032 -11.9032 
7 0.020479 92.85893 7.141069  0.134351 7.268909 92.73109 
  -14.264 -14.264   -12.077 -12.077 
8 0.020766 93.05509 6.944907  0.134383 7.299587 92.70041 
  -14.9908 -14.9908   -12.1927 -12.1927 
9 0.020958 93.17355 6.826446  0.134408 7.330241 92.66976 
  -15.6841 -15.6841   -12.2812 -12.2812 
10 0.021087 93.2387 6.761301  0.134438 7.357096 92.6429 
    -16.267 -16.267     -12.3509 -12.3509 
Notes: Cholesky Ordering: LI LM, Standard Errors:  Monte Carlo (100 repetitions)             
Table 10: Variance Decomposition for Korea 
Variance Decomposition of 
LI:      Variance Decomposition of LM: 
 
Period S.E. LI LM   S.E. LI LM 
1 0.019765 100 0  0.081054 3.767607 96.23239 
  0 0   -7.55895 -7.55895 
2 0.023102 99.76627 0.23373  0.102724 2.377794 97.62221 
  -4.28299 -4.28299   -7.08835 -7.08835 
3 0.026931 98.76076 1.239241  0.1224 4.198122 95.80188 
  -3.99355 -3.99355   -8.19928 -8.19928 
4 0.029722 97.23416 2.765838  0.138483 5.705997 94.294 
  -5.29946 -5.29946   -9.23975 -9.23975 
5 0.032179 95.0728 4.927203  0.152848 8.241795 91.7582 
  -6.53097 -6.53097   -10.9795 -10.9795 
6 0.034287 92.38633 7.613674  0.165664 11.11894 88.88106 
  -8.78309 -8.78309   -12.7173 -12.7173 
7 0.036155 89.23916 10.76084  0.177299 14.36836 85.63164 
  -11.0019 -11.0019   -14.5966 -14.5966 
8 0.037831 85.73493 14.26507  0.187899 17.82596 82.17404 
  -13.4092 -13.4092   -16.2771 -16.2771 
9 0.039358 81.98362 18.01638  0.197593 21.40274 78.59726 
  -15.5849 -15.5849   -17.7794 -17.7794 
10 0.040769 78.10419 21.89581  0.206465 25.00394 74.99606 
    -17.582 -17.582     -18.9809 -18.9809 
Notes: Cholesky Ordering: LI LM, Standard Errors:  Monte Carlo (100 repetitions 
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